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Double Threshold Authentication Using Body
Area Radio Channel Characteristics
Nan Zhao, Aifeng Ren, Fangming Hu, Zhiya Zhang, Masood Ur Rehman,
Tianqiao Zhu, Xiaodong Yang, and Akram Alomainy
Abstract— The demand of portable and body-worn devices1
for remote health monitoring is ever increasing. One of the2
major challenges caused by this influx of wireless body area3
network (WBAN) devices is security of user’s extremely vital and4
personal information. Conventional authentication techniques5
implemented at upper layers of the Open System Interconnec-6
tion (OSI) model usually consumes huge amount of power. They7
also require significant changes at hardware and software levels.8
It makes them unsuitable for inherently low powered WBAN9
devices. This letter investigates the usability of a double threshold10
algorithm as a physical layer security measure in these scenarios.11
The algorithm is based on the user’s behavioral fingerprint12
extracted from the radio channel characteristics. Effectiveness of13
this technique is established through experimental measurements14
considering a variety of common usage scenarios. The results15
show that this method provides high level of security against16
false authentication attacks and has great potential in WBANs.17
Index Terms— Wireless body area networks, physical layer18
security, radio channel features, authentication.19
I. INTRODUCTION20
W IRELESS Body Area Networks (WBANs) have seen21 a rapid growth in the recent years. Though its appli-22
cations range from surveillance to entertainment and sports23
to military, remote health monitoring still serves as the24
prime focus. Health care devices using IEEE 802.15.6 and25
IEEE 802.15.4j standards are now part of thousands of house-26
holds [1]–[7]. Along with numerous benefits, WBAN devices27
suffer from a number of challenges. Privacy of user and28
security of a highly personal data based on remote observation29
of user’s vital physical parameters is one of the major issues.30
Low power requirements due to inherent nature of the body-31
worn devices and regulatory restrictions further complicate32
provision of efficient security measures in such devices.33
Authentication of user’s identity is the first hurdle in devel-34
opment of a secure system before responding to a general35
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security breach and attack [8]. Recent studies show that 36
IEEE 802.15.6 standard still has a long way to go to ensure 37
privacy of the user [9]. In-home health care devices are at a 38
greater risk of potential theft of pre-shared key. Traditional 39
encryption methods have therefore, limited ability of denying 40
admission to an attacker in the network posing as a legitimate 41
node [10]. On top of that, these conventional security methods 42
usually require high power and substantial changes at hardware 43
and software levels. Hence, there is an apparent need to 44
devise new and improved processes for the certification of 45
the WBAN nodes. 46
Use of Physical Layer Security (PLS) technology based on 47
antenna and propagation channel characteristics can be a well- 48
suited alternative to the conventional security methods for the 49
WBANs. However, benefits of the PLS cannot be exploited 50
to its full extent using traditional protocols by combining 51
802.15.6 standard for power consumption and emergency 52
transport requirements [11]. 53
Some progress in this direction has been reported in the 54
literature. Ali et al. have proposed a mechanism to secure 55
the data provenance for body-worn devices by exploiting 56
spatio-temporal characteristics of the wireless channel [12]. 57
In [13], wave is used as the noise to assist matching of legal 58
nodes. Shi et al. [14] have used Received Signal Strength 59
Indicator (RSSI) to deal with the issue of authentication of 60
the nodes in the network. This letter presents a new user 61
authentication technique for the WBAN devices based on 62
the combinations of user’s behavior fingerprint and channel 63
features, which improves the system security. WBAN sensor 64
nodes equipped with an external antenna has been used to 65
extract the channel characteristics and fingerprint of the user’s 66
habitual actions. A number of our daily life scenarios are 67
considered. The experimental results have shown that the 68
proposed authentication method is very proficient in repelling 69
large number of low-level security attacks. Moreover, it does 70
not require a key sharing resulting in a very energy efficient 71
operation. 72
Following the introduction in this section, the letter is orga- 73
nized in five sections. Section II, describes the methodology 74
and experimental setup. Section III establishes the usability 75
and distinguished ability of the proposed scheme through 76
experimental results and detailed analysis. Conclusions are 77
drawn in Section IV. 78
II. METHODLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 79
The experiments are conducted in a laboratory envi- 80
ronment replicating a common home-based health care 81
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Fig. 1. Illustration of two experimental regions; non-trust region (outer circle)
having MSs B, D, T and E monitoring the user brushing teeth, drinking water,
taking medicine and eating breakfast; limited-trust region (inner circle) having
the WHMD node W.
scenario. A battery-powered wearable health-monitoring82
device (WHMD) has been positioned on the right upper arm83
of the user. The WHMD communicates continuously with the84
monitoring station (MS) connected to a computer placed in85
the same room at a distance of 10m. Four daily life actions of86
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine, and eating87
breakfast are considered in this experiment. The WHMD88
monitors the changes in the radio channel characteristics89
caused by the user’s actions and exchanges the RSSI data with90
the MS. The MS gathers and stores this data, which provides91
the behavioral fingerprint of the user. It is then used for the92
identity authentication.93
In a typical indoor environment, radio wave will propagate94
along multiple paths. Each path will carry different amount of95
fading and time delay. The complex baseband signal voltage96
here is defined as:97
V =
N∑
i=1
‖Vi‖ e− jθi (1)98
where Vi and θi are the amplitude and phase of the i th path,99
N is the total number of paths. The RSSI is defined as:100
RSSI [d Bm] = 10log2
(
‖V ‖2
)
(2)101
Taking the human body presence in consideration, Equation 2102
can be expanded as:103
M SRSS I [d Bm] = W H M DRSS I + E I F + User [m, s] (3)104
where E I F is the environmental loss factor and User [m, s]105
represents the multipath shadow component due to the user106
motion.107
To clearly describe the initial security status of the WBAN108
nodes, the measurement area is divided into a non-trust and109
a limited-trust region (Fig. 1). The nodes located in non-110
trust region are considered to have an initial security status111
of being suspect and may be compromised. On contrary, the112
limited-trust region is envisaged to be equipped with basic113
safety protection measures (for example random storage, etc.).114
The nodes located in this region are therefore not easy to be115
compromised and set to have an initial security status of being116
safe.117
Security of the WHMD is relatively easier to be breached118
as it can get missing or stolen due to user’s carelessness. It is119
therefore. Considered to be in non-trust region. The MS has120
Fig. 2. WHMD and MS1-4 communication timing diagram.
got fixed installation and less susceptible to stealing. It is there- 121
fore placed in the limited-trust region. Complete trust for the 122
MS is however, not realistic as it stores highly sensitive data. 123
Since, this study is intended to prove the idea, considerations 124
in the experimental scenarios are kept simple and advanced 125
hardware or active attacks are not taken into account. They 126
will be however, studied in future expansion of this work. 127
Four common habits of any user are considered namely 128
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine and eating 129
breakfast. The measurements were taken by making the human 130
subjects to repeat the considered habitual action repeatedly 131
over the course of the measurement. The variations in the 132
channel characteristics in the form of RSSI values are moni- 133
tored by the WHMD in each scene. It is then transmitted to 134
the MS that keep a record of it. 135
Fig. 2 shows the communication timing diagram between 136
the WHMD and the MSs. M S1−4 represents the four moni- 137
toring stations, one in each scenario. When the subjects arrive 138
at the designated measurement scene, the WHMD broadcasts 139
a W H M D_hello packet. On receiving this W H M D_hello 140
packet, the MS enters into the active monitoring state and 141
sends an M S_hello packet to the WHMD showing its readi- 142
ness to receive the WHMD data. The WHMD then starts send- 143
ing the W H M D_ ping packets until it receives an M S_O K 144
packet from the MS indicating that the MS has gathered 145
sufficient information. During this communication, the MS 146
reads the RSSI value of the W H M D_ ping packets for the 147
characterization of the radio channel to be used for authentica- 148
tion. In addition to the RSSI value, the W H M D_ ping packets 149
also carry other statistics, such as time alignment, battery con- 150
sumption, etc. This data is however non-sensitive and does not 151
contain any private information. Thus the identification process 152
hardly has any extra packet consumption and no added energy 153
burden to the system. The MS gathers RSSI measurements 154
from each W H M D_ ping packet at 500ms interval. These 155
measurements are randomly stored in the module flash. 156
Both the WHMD and MS are wireless modules based 157
on Texas Instruments system-on-chip (SOC) for wireless 158
sensor networking solutions, C8051 MCU configuration and 159
control communication unit. The HBE-ubiquitous Sensor 160
Network (USN) module is used as the WHMD. It employs 161
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and can be programmed to achieve 162
output power levels of −25.2 dBm to 0.6 dBm. The sensitivity 163
of the receiver is −94 dBm. The onboard sensors are equipped 164
with circularly polarized, omnidirectional antennas operating 165
at 2.4 GHz. The module can be used in a variety of WBAN 166
applications as meets the low power consumption and wireless 167
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Fig. 3. Prototype and S11 of the meandered line external antenna used with
HBE-USN-module.
Fig. 4. Measurement scenario for the user in drinking water configuration
showing location of the WHMD and the MS with three sets of randomly
saved RSSI data recorded by the MS.
management requirements.168
The HBE-USN-Sensor tag module is programmed to trans-169
mit a power level of −1.5 dBm at 2.425 GHz communication170
channel to avoid interference with existing Wi-Fi signal avail-171
able in the experimental area. Communication between the172
WHMD and the MS is established using an external antenna173
connected to the HBE-USN-Sensor tag via an SMA port,174
as shown in Fig. 3. The antenna is of meandered line type175
operating at 2.4 GHz with good impedance matching and has176
dimensions of 26mm × 26mm × 1mm. The antenna prototype177
and measured S11 of the antenna is illustrated in Fig. 3.178
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION179
The RSSI data has been measured for the four considered180
user habits. Fig. 4 shows the measurement scenario for the181
user in drinking water configuration along with three sets of182
randomly stored RSSI data by the MS. To simplify the idea and183
ease of understanding, 36 packets are collected and divided184
into three sets in this work. In practical scenarios, the length185
of the data could be longer producing better randomness.186
The RSSI sequence based on the fingerprint of user’s187
habitual behavior is difficult to replicate or reproduce. In this188
environment, the WHMD is needed to be certified by the189
MS who is acting as the certifier. The authentication scheme190
has two processes namely behavioral fingerprint registration191
and identity authentication resulting in a double threshold192
authentication, as shown in Fig. 5.193
In order to compare the behavior of the user with the legal194
template, correlation coefficient (CC) is computed as:195
CC =
∑n
i=1
(
Xi − X¯
) (
Yi − Y¯
)
√∑n
i=1
(
Xi − X¯
)2√∑n
i=1
(
Yi − Y¯
)2 (4)196
where Xi and Yi are the i th packet of RSSI values, X and Y197
are the mean values of RSSI sequence.198
Fig. 5. Double threshold authentication scheme consists of the behavioral
fingerprint registration and identity authentication processes.
TABLE I
CORRELATION RESULTS FOR THE NORMAL CERTIFICATION
USING DOUBLE THRESHOLD TECHNIQUE
The authentication scheme is implemented in four steps. 199
Step one is the acquisition of the subject’s behavior fingerprint 200
by the MS, segmentation of the data and random storage as the 201
template. Step two involves the repetition of the same behavior 202
by the subject wearing the WHMD and collection of the new 203
channel characteristics by the MS. Step three comprises of 204
the MS calculation of the CC of the new channel features 205
with the previously stored information in step one. Finally, 206
step four involves the certification of the WHMD by the 207
MS through double threshold authentication. Certification is 208
granted if correlation value with each template is more than 0.8 209
and traversal or correlation between two data segments is more 210
than 0.85. It shows that the behavioral fingerprint of the user 211
seeking certification is in good match with the fingerprint of 212
the legal user (template). This employs that the current subject 213
can be perceived as the legal user since it is very difficult 214
to reconstruct the radio channel. If the subject wearing the 215
WHMD passes the authentication stage, its security status 216
(which was in the non-trust region at the beginning) would 217
be elevated to the limited-trust region. 218
The MS receives the RSSI data from the WHMD for 219
the four considered scenarios. This forms the legal behavior 220
template of the user and is being stored at the MS. To further 221
strengthen the security, this data storage can use certain 222
protection measures, such as fragmented storage or feature 223
extraction. This work uses the fragmented storage approach 224
due to its simplicity and effectiveness by dividing and storing 225
the RSSI data into three segments. The correlation results for 226
the three segments of the WHMD data have been summarized 227
in Table I. The results show that the double threshold algorithm 228
ensures high level of security. It ensures that the user only 229
achieve identity authentication if correlation with the template 230
is greater than 0.8 and traversal correlation or correlation of 231
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Fig. 6. CC results for the simulated attacks against the double threshold
authentication algorithm, (a) Brushing Teeth, (b) Drinking Water, (c) Taking
Medicine, (d) Eating Breakfast.
two data segments is more than 0.85 indicating high match to232
the user behavioral fingerprint.233
This double threshold approach is not only a very efficient234
authentication method but also has strong resistance to the235
attackers. Three simulated attacks are studied to depict vigor236
of the proposed technique against the attackers. Worst-case237
scenario is analyzed assuming that the attackers have compro-238
mised the WHMD by reaching the limited-trust region (it is239
very difficult in realistic conditions due to high isolation and240
protection provided by traditional measures such as locked241
doors). These simulated attackers, with similar physique,242
observe and imitate the action of legal user in every scene.243
To further test the strength of the proposed approach, these244
simulations were repeated 10 times.245
The results in Fig. 6 show that in even the worst-case246
scenarios, the attacker cannot succeed in the identity fraud.247
Only the attacker 1 in brushing the teeth scene has found248
a rare success, as depicted in Fig. 6(a). Here, two sequence249
relativity values are greater than 0.85 indicating that the feature250
is very obvious. This is due to the fact that the Brushing251
Teeth motion of the simulated attacker is similar to that of252
the legal user. However, due to the existence of multiple253
authentication base stations, the fake attacker was unable to254
complete the attack. Also, this is a rare hit which cannot be255
repeated multiple times as no other success is observed in the256
following simulations. Usefulness of the proposed algorithm257
in the identity authentication and against security attacks is258
evident from these results.259
IV. CONCLUSION260
A new technique for the user identification in WBAN sensor261
nodes is presented. This physical layer security method is262
based on the observation of the user’s behavioral fingerprint263
through radio channel characteristics. The body-worn WHMD264
sends channel information to a static MS. The proposed265
technique makes use of double threshold identification strategy266
calculating correlation between first and subsequent RSSI267
samples received by the MS and traverse correlation between268
different segments of the sample data itself. Three simulated269
attacks are also used to study the strength of the proposed270
technique against the attackers.271
Results based on the experimental data collected consider- 272
ing four daily life scenarios of brushing teeth, drinking water, 273
taking medicine and eating breakfast show that the proposed 274
technique can effectively realize the identity recognition and 275
has good resistance to the attackers. The WHMD only sends 276
non-sensitive information packets and the channel character- 277
istics at the time of transmission are unknown to it with 278
minimum privacy at stack. The MS receives the channel 279
characteristics sequences in the form of the RSSI stored 280
randomly in the flash. It also ensures resistance against the 281
attacks in the WBAN home health care scenarios. Furthermore, 282
this method does not demand any hardware upgrades and 283
no additional packet transmissions are required minimizing 284
energy consumption. 285
These features make this method very suitable for low- 286
power WBAN applications containing highly sensitive private 287
data. Future aspects of this work include enhancement of the 288
robustness of this method with added security of the WBAN 289
applications. 290
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